From the early 1600s, when tobacco exports the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two nuclear literally saved the struggling Jamestown settlesuper powers, has subsided; and the influence of ment, to the January 4, 1980, embargo of grain to the Third World, Japan, and OPEC has risen. the Soviet Union, food and agriculture have Third, not only the degree of U.S. influence, but played varied roles in international affairs of the the desire of the U.S. to influence international U.S., that is, in the political, military, economic, economic affairs has apparently diminished, esand cultural exchanges that affect the power of pecially since the Vietnam conflict. Fourth, inthe U.S. relative to other sovereign nations.
ternational economic problems have grown in Food donations have been used as a huscale, complexity, and interrelatedness. It is bemanitarian gesture to avert starvation. Food excoming increasingly difficult to identify discrete port embargoes have been used as weapons problems and solutions that an individual nation against foreign adversaries and domestic scarcan resolve. Fifth, there is a growing wariness of cities. Food pledges have been used to promote the increased national vulnerability and costs of international food aid conventions. Food import increased international interdependence. quotas have been reallocated to reward friendly
The decline in U.S. prestige and military nations and penalize unfriendly ones. U.S. food superiority was an issue during the 1980 presishipments have been used to feed Allied soldiers dential campaign. Whether the U.S. has the deand to barter for strategic materials. Food exsire or the capability to regain lost influence is ports have been used to bolster the domestic uncertain. The euphoric and patriotic response to economy and strengthen the dollar.
the return of the hostages from Iran and the pubDuring the 1970s, four U.S. grain embargoes, lic support of increased military expenditures rising real food prices, increased U.S. food exmay signal an increase in the desire of this counports, success of OPEC, massive U.S.-Soviet try to reassert itself in world affairs. Possibly grain deals, severe food shortages in Africa and there will come the realization that the last three southeast Asia, and dwindling reserve stocks decades of unprecedented world economic exfocused increased attention upon U.S. "food pansion have coincided with unprecedented power." This paper assesses the potential role world trade (Lewis) . Nevertheless, it will not be and power of food in the international affairs of too surprising if the prominence of the U.S. in the U.S. during the 1980s. It is argued that the international affairs further recedes. The center role and power of food in future international afof world power has shifted. The predominance of fairs of the U.S. will be dependent upon the posiEurope declined as a result of colonial revolution and influence of the U.S. in international tions and the ascendency of formerly backward relations and food affairs; and the extent of scarnations such as Russia and China (Morgenthau) . city or abundance of food in world markets.
Global Food Regime Challenged
U.S. POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL
Hopkins and Puchala (see especially pp.
RELATIONS AND FOOD AFFAIRS
18-25) argue that international food affairs are governed by a "global food regime," which they Changing Character of International Relations define as a set of rules, norms, or institutional expectations that guide decisions relating to in-T. K. Warley, a distinguished Canadian agriternational food transactions. Hopkins and cultural economist, has identified five key asPuchala maintain that the regime was U.S. cenpects of the changing character of international tered and U.S. prescribed from the late 1940s to relations. First, economic policy has replaced the early 1970s, and was guided by the following strategic balance, territorial integrity, and ideobasic principles: (1) free trade in theory, with logical competition as the core of foreign policy. considerable deviation in practice; (2) stabilizaSecond, there is today more pluralism in world tion of international grain markets by adjustpolitical and economic affairs. The influence of ments in the U.S. via production controls, gov-ernment stock accumulation, foreign donations, controls and thereby force on the world markets and market duopoly with Canada; (3) provision even greater instability than otherwise would of food aid, but with as much attention to disposhave been experienced (Johnson) . Dale Hathaing of surpluses, creating markets, and cultivatway, the former USDA Under Secretary for Ining allies as to alleviating global malnutrition; and ternational Affairs, has implied that the U.S. (4) adherence to a philosophy of international needs to take a more active role in grain trade in "hands off" and national sovereignty in food order to cope with the Soviets. But I am approduction, consumption, and distribution matprehensive of increased direct U.S. government ters.
involvement in commercial grain trade. Hopkins and Puchala contend that this set of If the meager results of the Tokyo Round of norms was challenged and outmoded by the early trade negotiations and the apathy relative to the 1970s. The New International Economic Order 1974 World Food Conference recommendations of the Third World countries, emboldened by the are any indication, international agreements to success of OPEC, began to challenge the concept foster agricultural trade and food security will be of free trade and seek a deliberate manipulation slow to materialize (Callear and Blandford) . But of international terms of trade in their favor. The the problems are not insurmountable; world Soviet Union and China, largely absent from the unanimity is not required. As is indicated below, international markets prior to the 1970s, became substantial grain deficits could be overcome by significant influences. Food aid was criticized for modest increases in productivity or grain prices. the disincentive effect it had on production in the International grain price stability and food securecipient countries and for its political implicarity could be achieved by modest world grain retions. The U.S. became less willing and able to serve stock levels of 15 to 80 million metric tons stabilize the international grain markets as ex- (Houck and Ryan, p. 31 ). The problems of grain ports boomed and stocks dwindled. Steps were pricing, contracting, and storage risks could be taken to establish an international food convenreduced by the use of the futures market (Seevtion and improve the multilateral coordination of ers). Orbiting satellites could increase crop refood assistance. Internationally sponsored agporting accuracy and timeliness and, thereby, ricultural research institutes were established to improve the economic efficiency of market price expand food production in the developing counsignals. In short, there are steps that can be taken tries and to spread the "green revolution." now, without threatening national sovereignty or requiring total international agreement, which Role of Markets could enhance the contribution of food and agriculture in international affairs. Indeed, as It is possible to acknowledge the imperfections Callear and Blandford have argued, it is very unof and challenges to a trade-oriented world food likely that international agricultural agreement regime and embrace the need for emergency food will be possible unless and until trade liberalizarelief, yet advocate strengthening the internation is achieved. tional market mechanism. Despite the frequent and disruptive effects of government involvement, such as the 4 U.S. grain embargoes the FOOD POWER past 8 years and the fickle grain purchases of the Soviet Union, world agricultural trade during the Food as an Economic Weapon past 30 years has grown by 5.3 percent annually-almost double the 2.7 percent growth in The challenges to U.S. influence in internaworld production (O'Brien). Despite policies to tional affairs, coupled with booming U.S. grain protect domestic agriculture, changes in grain exports and the success of OPEC, stimulated prices are correlated among major grain exportdiscussion of food as a weapon or foreign policy ers, and to a lesser extent among grain importers.
tool. As Don Paarlberg notes (p. 1): "The Collins found that major grain exporting nations, thought has arisen that some of the lost U.S. such as Australia, Canada, Argentina, and international influence might be recaptured Brazil, have elasticities of price transmission for through the use of food." wheat and corn fairly close to one. Importing But, food is very different from crude. First, countries, such as Japan, Egypt, India, and only 10 percent of the world's food is consumed Nigeria, ranged from 0.3 to 0.8. Also, Thompson in countries other than where it is produced, and Dahl have found that weekly corn prices in whereas 50 percent of the oil is consumed in the U.S. and Rotterdam markets are highly corcountries different from where it is produced related.
(Nau). A stoppage of oil exports would drastiThe problem of increasing world market instacally affect availability throughout the world. A bility during the 1970s was the result of reduced curtailment of food exports would have a modest grain stocks and government policies-the most impact upon world food supplies. Second, it is important policy was the Soviet Union's attempt essentially costless to "store" oil in the ground, to achieve internal price stability through trade whereas food is perishable and costly to hold off the market to drive up prices. Third, food is a
The misconception of the potential for food basic human need, and attempts to use it as a power arises from the belief that a cartel's potendiplomatic weapon by withholding it in situations tial depends upon the share of world exports. It where starvation might result would be condoes not. It depends upon the share ofproducdemned by the world community. This does not tion. A case in point is rice. The U.S. is the mean that food power is negligible, but it does world's leading rice exporter, with 30 percent of suggest that, politically, morally, and economthe total, yet it produces only 2 percent of total ically, food is a considerably weaker diplomatic world production: clearly, reducing rice exports weapon than oil.
would have little influence upon world prices. Since U.S. agricultural production has risen Food Market Power via Cartels more slowly than world production during the past 30 years, this country's food power has been One measure of the power or leverage of food declining rather than increasing. in international affairs is the potential to increase export revenues by cartel action. Food leverage depends upon the derived demand elasticity of Food Power via Embargoes exports (Ex). If the derived demand for exports is inelastic, revenues may be increased by limiting
In comparison with a cartel, an embargo is a exports. The derived demand depends upon the more blatant attempt to wield food power. Obvicartel's share of the world production (W), the ously, trade must be occurring in order for shipelasticities of food supply (ESROW), and demand ments to be stopped. Assuming that there are no (EdROW) in the rest of the world (Van Duyne), that alternative sources of imports for the adversary is, and no alternative export outlets for the country imposing the embargo, the net social cost (reduc-
tion of consumer and producer surplus) imposed upon each country depends upon the square of If food supply or demand in the rest of the world the share of the amount embargoed (X/Q) 2 , the is highly elastic, or if the cartel controls a small elasticities of supply (Es) and demand (Ed), and share of world production, limiting food exports the equilibrium value (PQ) that would prevail will decrease the cartel's revenues and not without the embargo,' that is, greatly affect world markets and vice versa.
Suppose the U.S. wanted to increase grain exNet Social Cost = .5(X/Q) 2 PQ/(Ed + Es). port revenues by forming' a cartel. If the grain supply and demand elasticities in the rest of the The social cost imposed upon the adversary will world each equal 0.2 in absolute value, the U.S. be higher (1) the larger the relative amount emwould need to control one-third of world grain bargoed, (2) the lower the absolute value of the production. To achieve that, this country would supply and demand elasticities, and (3) the higher have to form a cartel with all the developed nathe equilibrium value. tions. If the supply and demand elasticities each
In the case of the recent Soviet grain embargo, equal 0.4, the cartel would need to control three-I have made some rough calculations using the fifths of world production, which is roughly equal above formula, which suggest that the net social to all the grain produced outside centrally cost imposed upon the U.S. was $145 million planned countries. Viewed from a different percompared to $470 million imposed upon the Sospective, if the U.S. attains 20 percent of world viets, assuming the U.S. and Soviet elasticities grain production (W), the rest-of-world supply are equal. 2 The point is that an embargo not only (EsROW), and demand (EdROW), elasticities would inflicts social cost upon the adversary-it also need to be .1 or smaller in order for the elasticity penalizes the domestic economy as well; and it of derived demand to be inelastic. This is much may in fact, depending upon the magnitudes and lower than the 0.2 to 0.4 commonly used (U.S. elasticities, impose greater social cost upon the Department of Agriculture 1971; Abbott; Abel; domestic economy than upon the adversary. Peterson; Bredahl et al. Even if we assume a Furthermore, the responsiveness of the internaprice transmission elasticity of 0.5, rest-of-world tional grain market or the transshipment black supply and demand elasticities less than 0.2 market appear to render any food embargo inefwould be necessary. Thus, the U.S. is not likely fective unless accompanied by a military blockto gain food power by forming a grain cartel.
ade.
'The net social cost corresponds to the area of the triangle formed, its apex being the with-embargo equilibrium price; its base being the horizontal distance between the domestic supply and demand curve at the without-embargo equilibrium price. The formula is an approximation to this area, assuming constant elasticities.
2 These values are based upon 0.2 supply (E,) and demand (El) elasticities for both U.S. and USSR; 17 million metric tons embargoed (X): without-embargo quantities (Q) of 300 million metric tons in the U.S. and 197 million metric tons in the USSR; and without the embargo price of $120 per metric ton in the U.S. and $160 per metric ton in the USSR. The grain supply and demand elasticities of wheat, rice, and coalrse grains, weighted respectively by production and consumption as reported by U.S. 
WORLD GRAIN DEMAND, SUPPLY
developed during the second world war has been AND TRADE PROSPECTS 3 exhausted; (2) major innovations are not likely; (3) surplus agricultural labor in developed counGrain Demand tries has already been absorbed in industry; (4) minerals and oil are becoming more scarce; (5) U.S. food power is most directly linked to the consumer preferences in developed countries major grains-wheat, corn, and rice-because have shifted to services and away from manufacthe U.S. is the world's leading grain exporter; tures, thereby dampening industrial demand; and grains are its most important agricultural export; (6) high taxes have diminished work and investand grains are important sources of energy in ment incentives and, consequently, growth. world diets. Accordingly, the demand, supply, Lewis reminds us "that the world economy has and trade discussion will focus on grains.
had long periods of prosperity (like 1850-1873) Future demand growth for grain (D*) (herein and long periods of relative stagnation (say an asterisk (*) signifies annual growth) depends , so that there is nothing strange in the upon population growth (N*), the income elasidea that the next two or three decades may turn ticity (Ey), the price elasticity of demand (Ed), out to be difficult" (p. 15). real per capita income growth (Y*), and real
The World Bank, in agreement with Lewis, grain price growth (P*), that is, observes "that world economic growth will be sluggish during the next few years, as oil-D* = N* + EyY* + EdP*.
importing countries... adapt to higher energy costs" (p. 1). The World Bank projects a 1980-90 We will now briefly examine each of these facper capita GNP growth of developed countries in tors. Since international relations, as well as curthe range of 2.5 to 3.1 percent, of developing rent and prospective levels of population, incountries from 2.1 to 2.9 percent, and centrally come, and prices differ greatly among countries, planned countries at 3.3 percent. These figures countries have been combined into familiar imply a world GNP per capita growth in the groups of developed, less developed, and cenrange of 2.5 to 3.1 percent during the 1980s, trally planned. The developed or industrial rewhich is slower than growth during the 1970s, gions include western Europe, Japan, Oceania, which in turn was slower than the growth during and North America. They contain 15 percent of the 1960s. world population and 60 percent of world gross
The world income elasticity for grain would national product (GNP). The centrally planned appear to lie in the range of .2 to .4 (Abel; U.S. countries include principally the USSR, China, Department of Agriculture 1978). For the U.S. and eastern Europe. They contain 30 percent of and other industrial countries, it is close to zero. world population and 20 percent of world GNP.
As per capita income grows in the rest of the The developing countries include the remainder world, the income elasticity of demand for food and contain 55 percent of world population and will likely decline. Thus, the impact of income 20 percent of world GNP. growth upon food demand will probably lessen in In 1978, the United Nations reassessed and the future. lowered its 1973 world population growth projecPrice trends are more difficult to forecast than tion for the 1980-90 period from 1.93 percent per either population or income. The inelasticity of annum to 1.80 percent per annum. The United both grain supply and demand means that small Nation's experts concluded that "the period of changes inproduction will cause large changes in the most rapid growth of the world population prices. Frequently, projections are based upon has already passed. .. . [T] he annual growth rate the assumption of quantity adjustments, but not of the world population today is 1.8 percent price adjustments (e.g., see Abel). Although unwhich is below the highest level of about 2 perderstandable in view of the limitations of internacent estimated for 1960-65. The rate is expected tional price data and price elasticity estimates, to continue its decline, . . . reaching 1.5 percent the omission of price adjustments results in exat the end of the century" (p. 3).
aggerated imbalances between projected demand World income growth is much more difficult to and supply. forecast than population growth. Nobel econo-
The index of prices received by U.S. farmers mist W. Arthur Lewis notes that "the period for food grains deflated by the consumer price since the second world war, down to 1973, has index (CPI) declined by 2.9 percent annually in been one of unprecedented growth for the world the 1950s, and by 4.5 percent annually during the economy as a whole, as well as for developed 1960s, but increased by 6.7 percent annually durand developing countries separately" (p. 1). But ing 1970 But ing -1977 dined relative to industrial products. But during cause of new feed additives and growth stimulthe longer period of 1960-77, which includes the ants, which improve feed conversion by 10 to 15 commodity price boom of 1973-74, unit values of percent, the grain demand for livestock feed grain exports increased relative to industrial could be reduced in the U.S. by 10 to 15 million products (Jabara) . These price data suggest that metric tons by 1990. real agricultural prices for grain declined during Taken together, these factors suggest a slower the 1960s but rose during the 1970s. growth in world demand for grains during the An added impetus to grain demand may be the 1980s than during the 1960s and 1970s. Populaconversion of grains to ethanol. Targets set by tion and income growth will likely be slower. If the Carter Administration called for the 1990 real prices rise, demand growth will be further gasohol use to comprise 10 percent of U.S. gasodampened. My estimate is that, with constant line consumption. O'Brien has estimated that an prices, world grain consumption will grow by 2 to upper limit of 14 to 25 million metric tons of corn 3 percent per annum, with 2.6 percent being the equivalent may be used annually for ethanol most likely (Table 1) . This compares to a 2.4 perproduction by 1985. Abel places the upper limit cent growth during the 1970s. The growth rate of grain use in ethanol at 20 million metric tons will be a slow 0.5 percent in the U.S. and 1.2 by 1990. At these upper limits, total U.S. grain percent in developed countries, a fast 4.2 percent demand would increase about 5 to 10 percent.
in developing countries, and a moderate 2.4 perBut these upper limits may be unrealistically cent in centrally planned countries. high, unless the economic feasibility of grain conversion to ethanol improves. A recent study Grain Supply by Schruben and Landkamer indicates that gasohol subsidies in excess of $10 per net bushel of Future growth in world grain supply (S*) decorn marketed through gasohol would be repends on the shift in the supply function due quired to make gasohol production profitable.
to technological improvement or productivity Thus, it does not appear that use of grain to progrowth (T*), the elasticity of supply (Es), and the duce gasohol will be a major factor influencing growth in real grain prices (P*), that is, U.S. grain demand during this decade.
There is the possibility that grain demand may S* = T* + EsP*. be reduced by the development of nonconventional substitute sources from the ocean, synthetProductivity improvements have been the major ic foods derived from oil, etc. I am in agreement source of agricultural expansion during the past with Wortman and Cummins and do not anticithree decades. The 1.9 percent annual rise in pate a significant impact of such nonconventional U.S. farm output, coupled with a .1 percent anfood sources as during the 1980s. However, benual decline in farm inputs, implies an annual a Based upon a 1.5 percent productivity growth and constant real prices from Coffey and Capps (p. 14) . b Based upon a high growth of demand with constant real prices from Coffey and Capps (p. 11) . c Assumes a price elasticity of supply and demand of 0.3, a world-wide annual real price increase of 1.5 percent, and a supply-demand growth of 2.15 percent. Numbers have been adjusted so that total consumption equals total production.
d The 1980 drought cut U.S. grain production by 35 million metric tons. The high U.S. growth rate is due to the recovery from the drought.
e The letters mmt mean million metric tons.
productivity growth of 2 percent (Ruttan, p. 18) .
couraging evidence of the favorable impacts of World agricultural productivity rose annually 2.2 improvements in human capital upon economic percent from 1950 . The progress. Thus, human capital improvements rate was 2.1 percent in developed countries, 2 may become a significant contributor to producpercent in developing countries, and 2.8 percent tivity growth and partially offset the adverse efin centrally planned countries.
fects of land, energy, and research funding scarThe National Academy of Sciences concluded, city. Current headlines suggest that major pro-"Recent trends in U.S. productivity relative to, ductivity increases may be forthcoming from geseveral crop and livestock products are sufficient netic engineering. to cause us to view the situation as we would Grain supply elasticity estimates span a wide clouds on a far horizon. Perhaps the clouds will range. Peterson estimated the long-run aggregate grow into a storm; perhaps not" (p. 189). Vernon agricultural supply elasticity for developing Ruttan, after reviewing the U.S. data, recently countries in the range of 1.25 to 1.66, which he stated, "It is difficult to avoid a conclusion that observes is 8 to 10 times greater than the widely the lag in research funding during the 1965-80 accepted .15 level. (Grain supply should be even period will be followed by further decline in total more elastic than aggregate agricultural supply.) productivity growth during the 1980-2000 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (1971 Agriculture ( , 1978 period. ... [E]ven a substantial effort . . . will suggests a .3-to .5-range for grain supply elastichave great difficulty pushing the rate of producity. Given a supply of .4, rising real grain prices tivity growth much above 1.5% per year" (p. 36).
of 3 to 4 percent would result in a production From 1972 to 1980, world agricultural producincrease equivalent to one-half of the historical tivity growth rates dropped by about 0.5 percentproduction growth rate. age points. There is concern that the world pro-I have projected 1990 grain production at the ductivity growth rate will decline further. Most conservative 1.5-percent growth rate, with an of the productive farmland has already been upward adjustment of 35 million metric tons to brought under cultivation. Additions to future offset the 1980 U.S. drought (Table 1) . These production will have to come primarily from exconservative projections of production, when panded yields arising from increased fertilizer coupled with the optimistic levels of consumpand pesticides, improved varieties, or irrigation.
tion, imply a doubling of imports by the centrally However, the costs of these inputs are sensitive planned countries and a quadrupling of imports to rising energy prices. Thus, rising energy prices by the developing countries by 1990. We will may dampen future productivity growth.
now examine import projections in more detail. The significance of rising energy prices can be illustrated by using the framework of Debertin Grain Trade and Interdependency and Pagoulatos, which relates aggregate U.S. crop supply response to real energy prices. DurGrain trade growth depends upon production ing the 1960s, U.S. crop production increased by and consumption growth and the extent to which 7.5 percent, while real gasoline prices decreased governments permit mports and exports to cushby 14 percent. Given a cross elasticity between th t aout oetimarket ar eeat veia rai trae is crop supply and energy price of -. 25, almost half tat abue one-irdets of intrnationa rrs in traei of the crop production expansion during the in puc in open markets, ands two-thirds is pried 1960s in the U.S. could be attributed to the dein public and private tenders and/or negotiated 1960s in the U.S. could be attributed to the dedine in real energy prices. 4 On the other hand, trades with centrall l from 1970-79, the 44-percent increase in crop Governments are directly involved in 90 percent output and the 60-percent increase in real energy of world grain trade as buyers andor sellers Of prices imply that the real energy price increase course, the fact that a majority of grain sales inreduced the expantsion of crop output by onesvolves governmental negotiations does not mean ,fourth. 5 that market forces are inoperative. No one would There are some encouraging signs of future accuse the Soviets of ignoring prices in their There are some encouraging signs of future productivity growth. Earl Swanson found little, if grain purchase decisions. any, support for the hypotheses that U.S. agGrain trade growth is also influenced by interricultural productivity growth has slowed in the national economic interdependencies, which in 1970s. T. W. Schultz has observed "that populaturn affect economic growth. Dornbusch indition quality matters and that a goodly number of cates that, due to trade interdependencies, a low-income countries have a strong positive rec-1-percent simultaneous increase in autonomous ord in improving this quality. These achievespending in all the OECD countries will increase ments imply favorable economic prospects, pro-GNP in the U.S. by 1.8 percent (pp. 51, 52). In vided they are not dissipated by political instabilthe reverse direction, a 1.5-percent expansion of ity." The World Bank also has found some enthe U.S. will spill over, resulting in an income rise in Germany by 0.2 percent, in Japan by 0.3 times faster than the domestic consumption and percent, and Canada by 0.7 percent. W. Arthur the dependence upon international grain markets Lewis points out that the remarkable economic will rise. If U.S. grain exports do not expand by growth of the developing countries during the at least 3 percent annually, surplus grainpast two decades has to a significant degree been producing capacity may emerge in the U.S. possible because of the expanded demand for 4. The U.S. share of world grain exports may their raw material exports arising from the rise, but the U.S. share of world grain production growth of the developed countries. Lewis stresswill stabilize or decline. The U.S. will not likely es that contrary to much of the rhetoric, future have sufficient leverage to exercise food power. growth in the industrial world will not be at the 5. Finally, world grain markets might not expense of Third World growth; rather, it will be boom as much during the 1980s as during the necessary to their growth.
1970s because of slower population and per John Mellor emphasizes the relatively stable capita income growth. relationship between growth in the demand for and the supply of food in the early stages of development: "The possibility of a 'gap' between IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS supply and demand increases with progress of the economic transformation and development Events of the past decade have suggested to and since the price elasticity of demand is also some an expanded role of food power in the indecreasing, the possibility of major price international diplomatic, military, and economic creases or the necessity for food imports appears affairs of the U.S. It has been especially tempting somewhat greater for the medium-income counfor those of us associated with U.S. agriculture tries than for the very low-income countries" to climb aboard this bandwagon and proclaim a (p. 78, 79). Mellor's insight casts the trends of larger role for agriculture. I will summarize the increased grain imports of the developing counfactors that point to both for and against a larger tries and rising world grain prices in a different role. light. It may be attributed, at least partially, to
The following factors point to a growing U.S. economic success rather than to agricultural failinfluence in food and diplomatic affairs and/or ure.
tightening world food markets, and hence to an In view of these interdependencies between expanded role of food in international affairs of the East and the West, between the North and the U.S.: the South, between agriculture and the rest of the economy, and between world prices and domes-1. Rising food trade and growing interdepentic prices, we would expect more convergence of dencies between East and West, North and grain production and consumption growth rates South. and the growth rates of exports and imports than 2. Apparent willingness of the U.S. to use emthe 180 million metric ton gap projected, assumbargoes for both foreign and domestic reasons. ing slow production and optimistic consumption 3. Proliferation of world food organizations, growth. In fact, an annual real price increase of conferences, and conventions. 1.6 percent would be sufficient to equalize the 4. Concern about slower world food producprojected world grain supply and demand growth tion growth due to scarcity of new land suitable at 2.15 percent, provided world markets were for agricultural production and reduced agriculclosely linked, that is, if the elasticity of price tural productivity growth. transmission is close to 1.
5. Increasing absolute numbers of malnour-I interpret the world production, consumption ished people and deepening grain deficits in the and trade projections in Table 1 as follows: developing countries. 6. The emergence of the Soviet Union and 1. Under conservative productivity and opChina as major agricultural importers and hence timistic consumption assumptions, 1990 comas potential targets for food power. bined grain deficits of the developing and cen-7. The continuing energy crisis, which raises trally planned countries would be 338 million production costs and creates a new demand of metric tons, compared to 114 million metric tons grain for use in gasohol. in 1980. Still, the U.S. could fill this deficit if 8. Increased bilateralism, segmentation, and, exports grow in the 1980s at the 11-percent rate hence, instability of grain trade. they grew during the 1970s.
9. Success of OPEC oil cartel, thus encourag-2. With more favorable productivity increases ing the creation of food cartels. and/or a modest l-to-2-percent real grain price
The following factors point to a waning influincrease, world grain production in 1990 would ence of the U.S. in international relations and a be an estimated 1,793 million metric tons. World shrinking share of agriculture, and, thus, a reexports would be 208 million metric tons, or 11.6 duced role of food in international affairs of the percent of world production.
U.S.: 3. U.S. grain exports will grow five or more 1. Slowed world food demand growth due to reduced population and income growth prospects the continued decline in the share of agriculture in the 1980s.
in the world economy, and the tarnished record 2. The increasing wave of protectionism to reof previous uses of food diplomacy. I hope that a duce domestic reliance on food imports. lessened role is the case, because it will be possi-3. The depletion of foreign exchange earnings ble to the extent that agricultural and general in oil-importing countries, which may necessitate economic progress occurs, international tensions further cutbacks in food imports. diminish, and international cooperation expands. 4. Growing disenchantment with food aid proMy conclusion is paradoxical: U.S. agriculture grams, both from the perspectives of the donor will have a diminished role in international afand the recipient.
fairs, but international affairs will have an in-5. Diplomatic sensitivity to use of food as a creased impact on U.S. agriculture. U.S. domesweapon or tool.
tic food demand will grow very slowly in the 6. Shrinking share of world agriculture as a 1980s. Hence, a vigorous U.S. agriculture will be percent of GNP, population, trade, and condependent upon exporting a larger share of prodsumer expenditures.
uction. This means assuring food importing na-7. Declining international influence and, tions that they can depend upon our food exports hence, the ability of the U.S. to bring about liband signaling food exporting nations that we ineral trade terms for agricultural products.
tend to compete for world markets. The use of 8. The possibility of breakthroughs in agriculfood as an economic weapon in international aftural technology or the improvements arising fairs jeopardizes U.S. credibility as a dependable from increased human capital that would accelsupplier and as a vigorous competitor. It prompts erate food supply growth.
the USSR, Japan, and other importers to con-9. The apparent minor adverse impact on the tract with alternative suppliers. It prompts Soviets of the recent grain embargo, despite the Argentina, Brazil, and other food exporters to favorable circumstances of reduced world expand production and compete with the U.S. supplies, record Soviet import intentions, and for the Soviet, Japanese, and other markets. Do two successive poor Soviet harvests, you expect the Soviet Union ever again to beOn balance, I am inclined to the view of a lesscome so dependent upon U.S. grain? Do you exened rather than an expanded role for food, pect Argentina to forfeit its new grain agreement largely because of the limited leverage of food, with the Soviet Union? I do not.
